Australia’s Counter-Terrorism: Strategic Alliances with United States and ASEAN Countries
Issues of
terrorism have regained its significance within international political and
security discourse since the end of cold war era. September 11 has also
refocused international security concern to terrorism as an imminent threat
toward world stability. According to David Rapoport, the world has witnessed
four waves of terrorism. The first began in 1880 and it was mostly carried out
by anarchist activities in Russia and Europe when terrorist groups tried to
assassinate politicians, monarchs and other prominent figures in hope of
turning masses into revolutionaries. The second wave began in 1920 and
continued until 1960s known for its string anticolonial movements by small
states seeking to topple down their colonial rulers. This would mount with the
emergence of independence movements in the post-Second World War era in many
states like India, Pakistan, Algeria, Indonesia, and so on. The third wave
rooted back in the 1960s when the New left and communist groups began carrying
out terrorist attacks in what’s called “urban guerilla” groups that tried to
overthrow corrupt governments and challenge the growing inequality between the
rich and the poor. Finally, the final wave began in 1979 with the Iranian
revolution and Soviet Union’s invasion to Afghanistan. Rapoport argues that
this unleashed a wave of religious terrorism that exists to this day
culminating in the creation of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and others.[1]
Although
Australia was never directly attacked by terrorism activities, its status as US
ally has prompted Australia to play a role in global war against terror.The
bombing attack of September 11 has brought Australia’s support for American
cause and their alliancemanship even closer. When US government proclaimed that
terrorist attacks are a challenge to civilized value and human security
worldwide, Australia was ready to help and assist US in any way possible. John
Howard stated that Australia can’t be a fair weather friend, it either is or
not a close ally as it cannot cherry pick their most important alliance.[2] As a response, US showed
its appreciation on Australia’s devotion in the struggle against terrorism. US
realized Australia’s prominence as it is the only state in Asia-Pacific region
that is really able and willing to generously contribute its resources in the
fight against terrorism both in form of political and military. US and
Australia did several cooperation in combating terrorism such as intelligence
sharing, high technology access, defense teamwork, and other consultative
works.[3]
To what extent then Australia has tried to play its role in
tackling the issue of terrorism? In order to answer that question in this
essay, I will first outline Australia’s domestic policy making in formulating
an effective strategy in tackling the issue of terrorism. Secondly, I will
explain its heightened cooperation with other actors like United States and
ASEAN countries to better answer how successful Australia has played its role
in the fight against terrorism.
a.
Australia Domestic Policy Making on Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Australian
domestic counter-terrorism policy making might be best understood by observing
its experiences with terrorist attacks. Domestically speaking, Australia has
never been targeted directly in the attacks; most of them were carried out
against foreign target that happened to be within Australian territory. Hilton
Bombing 1978, Turkish Consulate General in Sydney 1980, and Turkish Consulate
in Melbourne 1986 were among some of the examples of domestic attack that were
carried out by terrorist group. However, Australia has had significant
experience in international bombing that took place out of the country.
September 11 that killed two Australian citizens, Bali Bombing in 2001 and
2005, and Australian Embassy Bombing in Jakarta 20014 were among the examples.[4]
Those experiences urged Australian Government to start formulating
terrorism-related policy which involves security organization and intelligence
in dealing with terrorism. Most of their efforts are outlined in what’s called
as Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Action Plan (NCTAP). This policy
involves Australian Intelligence Community that consists of Australian Security
Intelligence Organization (ASIO), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service
(ASIS), the Office of National Assessment, the Defense Intelligence
Organization (DIO), THE Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), and the Defense
Imagery and Geospatial Organization (DIGO), Australian Federal Police, even
state police and Australian.[5]
Multiple
efforts of counter-terrorism are codified into Commonwealth Criminal Code Act
1995 which define terrorist act as an
act, or a threat to commitan act, that is done with the intention to coerceor
influence the public or any government byintimidation to advance a political,
religious orideological cause, and the act causes: death, serious harm or
endangers a person, serious damage to property, a serious risk to the health or
safety of thepublic, or , seriously interferes with, disrupts ordestroys
critical infrastructure such as atelecommunications or electricity network.[6]
The implementation of counter-terrorism policy has stirred intense debates
especially upon the notion of security versus liberty.[7]Legislative
responses continues to receive mixed public support. A Sydney Morning Herald
Poll in October 2005 saw 66 % of respondents supporting detention of terrorist
suspects without charge. The sammpercentage also support life-imprisonment for
supporting terrorist organization and seven year’s imprisonment for supporting
insurgencies where Australian troops are deployed.[8]While
supports coming from Australian citizens vary, the situation within its own
government was also quiet dynamic. Prime
ministers from two big parties, Labor and Liberal had the tendency to follow
public opinion, using populism to maintain its approval rating which sometimes
incites oppositional values between parliaments, political parties, and
bureaucracy.[9]
Despite
of the debates it incites, Australia remains adamant in shaping its counter
terrorism strategy. Some of its strategy entails (a) fighting violent and
extremist ideology; (b) stopping the chain of recruitment to prevent people
from becoming terrorists; (c) reshaping global condition in stifling the spread
of terrorism; (d) eliminating terrorist activities in Australia; and (c) giving
effective response in recovery.[10]Understanding
the trans nationalistic nature of some terrorism group, Australia also
implements several outreach programs through bilateral, regional, and
international approaches to expand its capacity and create the necessary cooperation
with other nations.
b. Cooperation with United States
Australia has been one of US’ traditional
vital ally and economic partner. US and Australia have been maintaining its
strong relationship, mainly characterized by shared democratic values and cultural
similarities. Their military alliance includes formal military alliance like
ANZUS which serves as the foundations of cooperation between countries. The
treaty then invoked for the first time- by Australia- in response to September
11 attacks. The two countries on August 2014 even signed US-Australia Force
Posture Agreement at the annual Australia-United States Ministerial
consultations (AUSMIN), paving the way for even closer defense and security
cooperation, including the annual rotation of Marines to Darwin and enhanced
rotations of U.S.[11]
US-Australia alliance is particularly an important anchor for peace and
stability in Asia-Pasific region. Prior to war on terrorism, countries already
shared in interest in maintaining freedom of navigation, over flight and other
lawful uses of the sea, including in the South China Sea.
During War on Terror, Australia has kept its
options open whether and if so how it would attach itself to an American-led
effort to topple down Saddam Hussein’s regime. It wished to stand by the Americans,
but it tends to take a pause in case such intervention sparks unintended and
unfitting consequences for the region and most importantly Australia’s direct
interest. Turmoil in Middle East can surely causes international oil crisis
that will harm America’s, Australia’s and other’s economy. While military
planning against Iraq went forward, Australia modestly leverage its influence
with US by reasoning that a regime can be better handled through engagement
than isolation or military operation.[12] However, this didn’t last that long and
Australia joined US various operation in Middle East as US key ally in war
against terrorism.
One of US-Australia main issue in its
counter-terrorism policy is its counter-radicalization strategy. However, it
has received harsh criticism regarding the efficacy of its approaches. Without
real objective scale to measure the effectiveness of the program, its
appropriateness is often deemed problematic.[13]Members
of Islamic community contend that Australia has modeled US securitization
policies which unfairly target the Muslim diaspora as being the causes of
extremism and proven counterproductive in elimination the spread of radicalism.[14] Moreover, Muslims have expressed general
distrust of the Government’s Strategies due to Australia actively instigating
violent conflicts with Islamic countries much like its ally, United States.
Many Islamic organization recommends
more of a soft approach that involve personal counter-radicalization
counseling by qualified and trusted Islamic leaders rather than messages that
are originating from government officials. They claimed the securitized
approaches simply leads to more hatred and that a softer co-operative approach
utilizing more muslim facilitator is needed.[15]
Many Islamic organisations recommend that a
more effective strategy would involve programs that implement personal
counter-radicalisationcounselling by qualified and trusted Islamic leaders
rather than messages that are originating from Government bureaucrats. They
claim the current securitised approach simply leads to resentment and that a
softer co-operative approach utilising more Muslim facilitators is needed. This view was also supported by some experts that acknowledge the grivances
mentioned by the Islamic community. They contend that Government
anti-radicalization messages are not reaching ‘young muslim’ as its main target
audience but rather being drowned out by the mass of extremist propaganda on
the internet. Rather that focusing too much on its old-fashioned way,
government should utilize their resources for training local Muslims to produce
meaningful online counter-radicalization narratives that would prevent them
from joining and buying into extremist narratives.[16]
c. Cooperation with Southeast Asian Countries
Another
example of Australia’s effort in involving multiple parties in its
counter-terrorism initiative was its major cooperation with South-East Asian
countries. Understanding that most of bigger terrorist threats come from
Australian’s neighboring countries especially in the region of South East Asia,
Australia felt the urged to create a stronger and more intense cooperation.
Bali Bombing 2002 in Indonesia was one of the momentums that push Australia in
initiating security cooperation against terror with South East Asian Countries.
In Southeast Asia, extremist groups linked to Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah
actually predated September 11. Extremists have since slipped in from Pakistan
and Afghanistan. Hatred against Western states, predominantly United States and
its allies such as Australia was increasing. Many attacks against Western asset
were carried out while creating instability in its host states. For instances,
through Abu Sayyaf revolutionary group in Philippine and those seeking
independence in Indonesian Aceh, they resorted to violence in disrupting
commercial and military traffic in the region.Australia saw that several
extremist movements in Indonesia, Philippine, or Malaysia have big potential to
transform into more violent terrorist groups.This was shown by the discovery In
Singapore of a plot aimed at bombing American diplomatic, military, and
commercial installation, and the Australian high commission.[17]
In response to Bali Bombing, Australia gave
direct aid to Indonesia in tracking the groups responsible for that attack.
After an arrest, it was found that those who committed the bombing may have
ties to Jemaah Islamiyahand also Al Qaeda. Jemaah Islamiyah was also found to
maintain relations with other groups in Malaysia and North Philippine such as
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia and Moro Islamic Liberation Front. This
interrelatedness prompted Australia to even heighten its cooperation with its
neighboring countries.On March 2003 Australia began its initiative that aims to
track the source of funding that has been sustaining the activities of
terrorist groups. It also appointed special anti-terrorism ambassadors in
Indonesia, Philippine, Malaysia, and also Thailand. In line with Australia’
sinterest in maintaining influence to increasethe security in South East
Asia,it also helped Singapore in providing more security guards for certain
flights understanding that Singapore has one of the busiest airport in the
world where traffic of both illegal people and weapon may take place. Through
Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime agendas that were held on ASEAN
Regional forum on June 2003, delegates from Australia gave his speech on the
importance of maintaining Australia-ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation and
resulted into joint declaration. Several initiatives proposed include
intelligence sharing between Malaysia and Australia and military joint
cooperation with Indonesia.
However, ASEAN-Australia over all counter
terrorism strategy was hampered to reach its maximum efficacy since ASEAN
convention on Counter Terrorism highly depends on each other’s willingness to
cooperate and the existence of non-interference norm within its organization
stand in the way. Article 3 states that “The Parties shall carry out their
obligations under this Convention in a manner con-sistent with the principles
of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of
non-interference in the internal affairs of other Parties.”[18]The
convention does not apply in cases where a terrorist offense is committed
within the territorial domain of another party, which hinders the monitoring of
known terrorist operations within another state. Also under Article 22 of the
convention, a party can withdraw from the agreement voluntarily“at any time
after the date of the entry into force of this Convention for that Party.”[19]The
development of a regional intelligence database on counter-terrorism will also be
affected by the degree of coordination among national agencies in various
member states. In some Southeast Asian countries, the September 11 attacks have
not improved the information flow between security and intelligence agencies.
Instead ASEAN states rely upon information supplied by external partners
including the U.S. and Australia.
In conclusion, although Australia mostly with
help from US has multiple policies in relation to combating terrorist
activities especially those who operate in its neighboring countries, there are
many things to improve from it. Some critics argued that its main counter
radicalization measures are too military centric in a way that it fails to
engage young Muslim to deradicalize but instead further confirmed terrorist
recruitment campaign that the West hates Muslim thus making them the enemy.
Various initiatives done with ASEAN member states has also resulted into arrest
and prosecution of some prominent terrorist figures, however the coordination
among states involved as a whole still lacks a necessary binding ability needed
to ensure all parties actively does their share of burden and commitment in
fighting terrorism.
**Image doesn't belong to me.
BOOKS
Hough,
P., Malik, S., Moran, A., &Pilbeam, B. (2015). International Security
Studies: Theory and Practice. London: Taylor & Francis Ltd.
JOURNALS AND OTHERS
Albinski,
Henry. (2002). Australia, the Terrorism Phenomenon, & the United States.AQ:
Australian Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 15-20.
ASEAN
Convention on Counter Terrorism. 2007. Cebu, Philippines. January 13, retrieved
on June 4th 2017 from http://www.aseansec.org/19250.htm
Australia
Counter-terrorism Laws Pamphlet, retrieved on june 6 2017, https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counterterrorismlaw/Documents/Australias%20counter%20terrorism%20laws.pdf
Bergin,
A. 2015.Debunking extremism needs more than a lame website, it needs strategic,
bold changes. Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January, retrieved on june 4thfrom
http://www.smh.com.au/comment/debunking-extremism-needs-more-than-a-lame-website-it-needs-strategic-bold-changes-20150114-12nq5f.html
Chow,
Jonathan. (2005). ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation since 9/11. AsianSurvey,
Vol. 45 No. 2, pg. 301-321.
Humphries,
David. (2005). Voters say yes to terror Australia. Sydney Morning Herald.
October 27th; The original report, posted on October 25thsuggested a figure of 75 % instead of 66 %.
Richardson,
R. (2013). Fighting Fire with Fire: Target Audience Responses to Online
Anti-Violence Campaigns, Sydney, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, p. 24, retrived
on June 4th 2017 from https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/fighting-fire-with-fire-target-audience-responses-to-online-anti-violence-campaigns/Fight_fire_long_paper_web.pdf
Shanahan,
R. (2014). Sectarian Violence: The Threat to Australia. National Security College
Occasional Paper, no. 7, p. 10
US
Department of States.(2017). US Relations with Australia Fact Sheet.Bueau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.Retrived on June 6th 2017 from https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2698.htm
Vaughn,
Bruce. (2004). Australia’s Straegic Identity Post-September 11 in Context:
Implications for The War Against Terror in Southeast Asia. Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 97
Veit,
Raphael.(2005). Australia and Counter-Terrorism. AQ: Australian Quarterly,
33-37.
[1]Hough,
P., Malik, S., Moran, A., and Pilbeam, B
2015
[2]Albinski
2002.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Chow2005
[5]Albinski
2002.
[6]
Australia Counter-terrorism Laws Pamphlet retrieved on june 6 2017, https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counterterrorismlaw/Documents/Australias%20counter%20terrorism%20laws.pdf
[7]Veit2005
[8]
Humphries 2005
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
US Department of States 2017
[12]Albinski
2002
[13]Shanahan
2014
[14]Richardson
2013, p.24
[15]ibid.,p.
1-6.
[16]Bergin
2015
[17]Vaughn
2004.
[18]ASEAN
Convention on Counter Terrorism 2007
[19]
Ibid.
Comments
Post a Comment